The CIA’s extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme, European reactions and the challenges for future international intelligence co-operation by Hillebrand, Claudia
Aberystwyth University
The CIA’s extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme, European
reactions and the challenges for future international intelligence co-operation
Hillebrand, Claudia
Publication date:
2009
Citation for published version (APA):
Hillebrand, C. (2009). The CIA’s extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme, European reactions
and the challenges for future international intelligence co-operation. (Clingendael Security Paper; No. 9).
Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen Clingendael.
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090401_cscp_security_paper_hillebrand.pdf
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Aberystwyth Research Portal (the Institutional Repository) are
retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the
legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Aberystwyth Research Portal for the purpose of private study or
research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Aberystwyth Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
tel: +44 1970 62 2400
email: is@aber.ac.uk
Download date: 09. Jul. 2020
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CIA’s extraordinary rendition and 
secret detention programme 
 
European reactions and the challenges of future 
international intelligence co-operation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Claudia Hillebrand  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael 
March 2009 
 
  
CIP-Data Koninklijke bibliotheek, Den Haag 
 
Hillebrand, C. 
 
 
The CIA’s extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme 
 
European reactions and the challenges of future international intelligence co-
operation 
 
The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. 
ISBN: 978-90-5031-140-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Language editing by: Peter Morris 
Desktop publishing by: Karin van Egmond 
 
Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen Clingendael 
Clingendael 7 
2597 VH  Den Haag 
Phone: +31 (0)70 – 3245384 
Fax: +31 (0)70 – 3746667 
P.O.Box 93080 
2509 AB  Den Haag 
E-mail: CSCP@Clingendael.nl 
Website: http://www.clingendael.nl 
 
© Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. All rights 
reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, 
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of 
the copyright holders. Clingendael Institute, P.O. Box 93080, 2509 AB The 
Hague, The Netherlands 
  
Contents 
 
1. Introduction.................................................................................. 1 
 
2.  Extraordinary means in times of terror? ....................................... 5 
Extraordinary renditions ........................................................6 
Detention camps, black-site prisons and the discussion about 
torture.................................................................................15 
Preliminary conclusion ........................................................26 
 
3.  Reactions, the involvement and ignorance of European states. . 29 
Investigations by national parliaments ..................................30 
Investigations by governments .............................................32 
Legal responses ...................................................................32 
No investigative reaction......................................................35 
The European Union ..........................................................36 
Preliminary Conclusion .......................................................37 
 
  
4.  Lessons to be learned? ................................................................ 39 
Diplomatic assurances .........................................................40 
The regulation and oversight of intelligence services .............41 
Ethical implications .............................................................47 
 
5.  Conclusion.................................................................................. 51 
 
References........................................................................................... 55 
 
About the Author ............................................................................... 73 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
‘Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. 
Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates.’ 
(Alexander Hamilton, 1787)1 
 
‘All I want to say is that there was ‘before’ 9/11 and ‘after’ 9/11. After 9/11 
the gloves came off.’ 
(Cofer Black, 2002)2 
 
 
Two images of the current ‘war on terrorism’ waged by the United States 
(US) reflect the extreme measures that the government has taken since 
terrorists attacked the country on 11 September 2001: one is a photograph 
published in various media which shows hooded and handcuffed detainees in 
orange overalls kneeling in wired cages, while the other shows a young female 
American soldier with a naked man on the floor to her right wearing a dog 
leash. Beside the military activities of the US government and its allies in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the activities of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
                                                 
 
1  Hamilton (1787).  
2   U.S. Congress, Joint House/Senate Intelligence Committee (2002). Cofer Black was the 
Director of the CIA Counterterrorist Center from 1999 until May 2002. 
2  
have been in the spotlight of discussions among media observers, European 
institutions, human rights activists and academic scholars for several years.  
 
The CIA has used parts of military prison facilities at, for example, 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (photograph 1), and Abu Ghraib, Baghdad, Iraq 
(photograph 2), for its own tactics in fighting terrorism.3 Such scenes of 
imprisonment and humiliation as illustrated by the two images are examples 
of US counter-terrorism activities beyond its state borders.  
 
Arguably, the US conception of the fight against terrorism as a ‘war’ led to 
the use of extraordinary instruments by its biggest civilian intelligence agency, 
the CIA. Such measures include extra-legal renditions of terrorist suspects 
and their subsequent detention in secret prisons. There are serious allegations 
that the CIA has used means of torture to interrogate several suspects 
although the then President Bush insisted that US institutions do not use 
torture.4 The humiliating pictures of soldiers at the prisons at Guantánamo 
Bay and Abu Ghraib are particularly startling illustrations of the extreme 
measures taken against some prisoners, however.  
 
As will be argued in this paper, the global reach of the CIA’s activities also 
involves European state authorities and other actors. Forms of involvement 
range from an operational involvement to tolerating, or ignoring, the use of 
European territory for the purpose of renditions. While this involvement has 
been investigated by the Council of Europe (CoE) in great detail as well as by 
the European Parliament (EP), the overall picture remains rather vague and 
important facts are still missing.5 Nevertheless, the facts that are known ought 
to be understood as pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. The dimension of the issue is 
visible and there are still new jigsaw pieces added thanks to investigative 
journalists, investigative committees, individual testimonies by former 
detainees, reports by human rights organizations as well as, to a much lesser 
extent, government documents and statements by government authorities.  
 
The US government reacted to serious criticisms and promised in 2006 that 
the prison camp at its US naval base at Guantánamo Bay would soon be 
closed. However, the facility remains open in 2008 and the condition of 
                                                 
 
3  Both detention facilities are American military-run. At Guantánamo Bay, the CIA has 
operated a holding and interrogation centre within the facility after the 9/11 attacks 
(Washington Post (2004)). The Fay-Jones Report on Abu Ghraib stated that the CIA 
conducted unilateral and joint interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. The CIA detainees 
at Abu Ghraib have locally been called ‘Ghost Detainees’ since they were not accounted for 
in the detention system. Cf. U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (2004).  
4  The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2006). 
5  Think of the destruction of CIA tapes depicting investigations during which the technique 
of so-called ‘waterboarding’ is used. Cf. Guardian (2007a). 
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several individuals who are imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay remains unclear. 
Moreover, the whereabouts of certain individuals have not yet been identified 
by human rights activists. Some of the detainees used to be European 
residents before they were transferred to one of those prisons, but the 
respective European state governments have been hesitant to accept their 
return. In countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany, former 
prisoners from Guantánamo Bay have struggled to be allowed to return to 
their European host country. Can we then claim, using an old image of 
disinterest and ignorance, that the European governments have behaved like 
the three monkeys: have they seen nothing, have they heard nothing and have 
they said nothing? I will argue in this paper that the reactions by European 
governments and bodies are more complex but that there is indeed (still) a 
tendency for European states to bury their heads in the sand. The potential 
involvement of European governments in the respective counter-terrorism 
activities by the US government and, in particular, by the CIA, has not been 
discussed extensively and both parliamentary and judicial investigations have 
barely taken place so far. 
 
Finally, the CIA’s activities give rise to the question of what, if any, lessons 
can be learnt and how, if at all, such incidents might be avoided in the future. 
This is so far under-researched and the final section of this paper will 
therefore focus on one aspect only: that the practice of so-called 
‘extraordinary renditions’ and secret detention illustrate serious problems with 
regard to the accountability and oversight of activities of intelligence services 
in general, and of foreign intelligence agencies in particular. This aspect has 
also been stressed by Terry Davis, the Secretary-General of the Council of 
Europe (CoE) on several occasions (cf. Section 3 of this paper). Assuming 
that an extreme case sharpens our analytical understanding, what can be 
learnt from this case in this context? 
4  
5 
2. Extraordinary means in times of 
 terror? 
This section seeks to explore the ‘jigsaw puzzle’ of CIA activities in the ‘war 
on terror’ since the terrorist attacks on US soil on 11 September 2001. I will 
focus on the two most controversial issues, the so-called extraordinary 
renditions as well as the secret detention programme and the related 
allegations of torture. Referring to three well-investigated cases of Italian, 
Swedish and German residents who have been transferred to secret prisons, I 
will illustrate the different forms of rendition and the different level of 
involvement by European state authorities.6 While critical voices might point 
out that it is hypercritical to use some individual testimonies to draw a general 
picture, the numbers that are provided elsewhere indicate a much broader 
picture. Cautious estimations suggest that about one hundred and fifty people 
have been rendered worldwide between September 2001 and the beginning of 
2005.7  
 
The 2007 European Parliament’s Temporary Committee (TDIP) report 
stresses that more than a thousand CIA flights crossed European airspace 
between the end of 2001 and the end of 2005 and might be connected to a 
                                                 
 
6  What has been published so far in this context was mainly uncovered by investigative 
journalists or became public through judicial procedures by affected individuals. 
7  The New Yorker (2005).  
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process of rendition.8 In a 2006 interview, the rapporteur of the TDIP, 
Claudio Fava, suggested that 30 to 50 people were rendered from Europe 
alone.9  
 
 
Extraordinary renditions 
 
The most detailed investigation into this issue so far has been carried out by 
the CoE Rapporteur Dick Marty.10 He maintained in two reports that 
between 2001 and 2006, European airspace had been used for flights 
operated by the CIA, and at least some of them for the purpose of 
extraordinary rendition. The term ‘extraordinary rendition’ is not a clearly 
defined legal term, however.  
 
The European Commission for Democracy through Law, the so-called 
Venice Commission, suggested that the term ‘rendition’ refers to ‘one State 
obtaining custody over a person suspected of involvement in serious crime 
(e.g. terrorism) in the territory of another State and/or the transfer of such a 
person to custody in the first State’s territory, or a place subject to its 
jurisdiction, or to a third State.’11 An individual is therefore surrendered to a 
foreign jurisdiction so that the receiving state can bring the person to trial for 
a certain criminal offence.12   
 
Such an extradition is strictly regulated by a formal legal process, usually 
based on an international treaty and common international practice 
nowadays.13 The term ‘extraordinary rendition’ describes a particular type of 
                                                 
 
8  The European Parliament (EP) set up a Temporary Committee on the alleged use of 
European countries by the CIA for the transport and illegal detention of prisoners (TDIP). 
The Committee’s ‘Report on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the 
transportation and illegal detention of prisoners’ was published in January 2007, cf. 
European Parliament (2007). Hereafter referred to as the TDIP Report.  
9  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (2006), par. 13 (hereafter referred to as the 
First Marty Report). 
10  First Marty Report; Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (2007) (hereafter referred 
to as the Second Marty Report). 
11  European Commission for Democracy through Law (2006), par. 30 (hereafter referred to 
as the Venice Commission Opinion). Established in 1990, this Commission is an advisory 
body on constitutional matters to the Council of Europe (cf. http://www.venice.coe.int/). 
12  Fitzpatrick (2003): 458. 
13  While most of the existing extradition treaties are bilateral, the introduction of the 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in 2004 provides a unique example of a multilateral 
framework. The EAW substitutes the existing extradition treaties among EU Member 
States. Since it crystallises and simplifies the previous procedures, the instrument has been 
widely used from the beginning. 
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such transfers. It is not an official term but it roughly refers to ‘any occasion 
on which there is little or no doubt that the obtaining of custody over a person 
is, for one reason or another, not in accordance with the existing legal 
procedures applying in the State where the person was situated at the time.’14 
Without exploring the legal debate, it is fair to observe that this type of 
rendition violates US law and existing international treaty responsibilities.15  
 
Extraordinary renditions in the context of CIA counter-terrorism activities are 
composed of three ‘steps’, or elements, namely the apprehension, the transfer 
and the end point.16 These steps are all interconnected and have to be taken 
into account for a full analysis of the challenges that arise from renditions for 
democratic societies. The three elements can take various forms. The 
apprehension might, or might not, include a legal process and it can take 
place either ad hoc or in a planned manner. Marty’s investigative report into 
the extraordinary rendition programme explains that some of the individuals 
were kidnapped and then transported either to a US-run detention facility or 
to countries which are known for their use of torture.17  
 
The transfer can then occur by various means, the most common of which is 
transportation by aircraft operated by CIA front companies or rental 
companies. Fava’s Report to the EP carefully pointed out that the Committee 
had collection data material suggesting that over one thousand stopovers had 
been made in Europe between late 2001 and late 2005, presumably operated 
by the CIA, and that some of those flights might have been used for the 
purpose of renditions.18 When Fava presented the report, he claimed more 
strongly that those flights were often used for the purpose of extraordinary 
renditions.19  
 
The end point might be either a US military detention centre, a detention 
facility belonging to a third state or possibly a joint detention centre.20 The 
variety of ways and means is illustrated, among others, by reports of non-
governmental organizations and individual testimonies by rendered 
                                                 
 
14  E.U. Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF) (2006), p. 6 
(hereafter referred to as the CFR-CDF Report). 
15  Silkenat / Norman (2007): 539. For an extensive legal analysis see The Committee on 
International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y. and The 
Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law (2004). Cf. 
Satterthwaite (2007). 
16  Cf. Reprieve 2007. 
17  Hakimi (2007): 444; First Marty Report. 
18  TDIP Report, p. 15. 
19  TDIP Rapporteur Claudio Fava quoted in the First Marty Report, par. 13. 
20  Reprieve (2007): 4. 
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individuals.21 Three cases are particularly well documented and will be briefly 
summarized in the following. One is the kidnapping of Hassan Mustafa 
Osama Nasr, usually referred to as Abu Omar, in Italy; the second case 
involves two Swedish residents, Mohammed al-Zery and Ahmed Agiza, both 
of whom are originally from Egypt; and the final case is the one of the 
German resident and Turkish citizen Murat Kurnaz. Much of what is known 
about the rendition flights was established by tracking down the aircraft 
involved with the data material provided by air safety agencies such as 
Eurocontrol and the European Union Satellite Centre. The aircraft with the 
tail-number N379P (N9068V) is sometimes referred to as the ‘Guantánamo 
Bay Express’.22 It is the plane which was involved in the Swedish case (see 
below), for example, as well as in many other transfers. Journalists found out 
that this aircraft belongs to a CIA front company, namely Aero Contractors 
Limited.23 
 
Italy 
 
The case in Italy was the first to be documented in Western Europe with 
respect to the extraordinary rendition campaign and it involves the first 
judicial examination of a case of extraordinary rendition. 
 
In February 2003, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, alias Abu Omar, was 
supposedly kidnapped by CIA officers in Milan. Via the US base in Aviano, 
Italy, he was transferred to Egypt, briefly released in 2004 and rearrested 
shortly afterwards by the Egyptian authorities.24 He was finally released in 
February 2007. In connection with this rendition case, international arrest 
warrants for the arrest of a total of 22 staff members of the CIA believed to 
have been involved in this case were issued by a Milan court in June, July and 
September 2005. Most of the suspects’ names are assumed to be aliases, 
however. The US government indicated that it would not extradite the US 
citizens to Italy, and in April 2006 the Italian government decided not to 
forward the extradition request.25 Three months later, however, the Milan 
court issued additional extradition requests for three more CIA operatives, 
including Jeffrey Castelli, the station chief of the CIA Office in Rome at the 
time of Omar’s abduction. Moreover, arrest warrants were issued for two 
senior Italian intelligence officers for alleged complicity in the kidnapping. On 
8 June 2007, a trial commenced in Milan involving 25 CIA officers and one 
                                                 
 
21  For collections of testimonies by individuals imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay see e.g. 
Meeropol (2005); Willemsen (2007). 
22  For example, Reprieve (2007). 
23  Grey (2006): 23. 
24  New York Times (2005a). 
25  New York Times (2006a). 
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American who used to work at the US military air base in Aviano, as well as 
nine Italian intelligence officers, some of whom were former high-ranking 
intelligence officials, and all were accused of having been involved in the 
abduction of Abu Omar.26 The Americans were put on trial in absentia. 
 
After only ten days, the trial was adjourned for the first time in order to clarify 
whether the Italian Prime Minister could testify in this trial.27 This was 
confirmed in the spring of 2008, when the trial finally resumed.28 Bruno 
Megale, the head of the anti-terrorism police in Milan, testified in court in 
May 2008. Megale explained in detail how his police unit slowly uncovered 
the involvement of the CIA in Omar’s kidnapping after his wife had reported 
him missing.29 The prosecution claimed that the Italian police were not 
informed about the CIA’s activities, but the Italian military intelligence 
branch, the Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare (SISMI) had 
been informed. This had been earlier denied by the then Director of SISMI, 
Nicolo Pollari, who testified in 2006 and who is one of the accused Italian 
officials. On 17 September 2008, the judge rejected a request by Pollari to 
suspend the trial mainly due to reasons of state security.30 But the trial was 
indeed suspended in December based on the government’s argument that 
certain testimony could threaten Italy’s national security in general and 
operations between Italian intelligence services and the CIA in particular.31 
This is currently being looked into by the Constitutional Court whose ruling 
on this issue is expected on 10 March. The trial concerning the kidnapping of 
Abu Omar is scheduled to resume on 18 March. 
 
Sweden 
 
In December 2001, the Swedish government decided to expel two residents of 
its country, namely Mohammed Al-Zery and Ahmed Agiza. Both of them 
were originally from Egypt and the Egyptian government had issued arrest 
warrants for them, partly based on secret information provided by the 
Swedish Secret Police (SAPO).32 In order to transfer the two men to Egypt, 
the Swedish government asked for assistance by means of an aircraft. On the 
same day, the two Egyptians were transferred by a CIA team from Bramma 
Airport, Sweden, to Cairo, Egypt.33 The story of Al-Zery and Agiza was the 
subject of a Swedish TV documentary which was aired on 17 May 2004. Staff 
                                                 
 
26  Times Online (2006b); Times Online (2008a); Los Angeles Times (2008). 
27  New York Times (2007a).  
28  Statewatch News Online (2008); New York Times (2008a). 
29  Los Angeles Times (2008). 
30  Times Online (2008a). 
31   International Herald Tribune (2008b). 
32   Grey (2006): 25. 
33  Riksdagens ombudsmän (2005). See also Swedish Parliament (2005). 
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members and police authorities at the airport also testified about the unusual 
circumstances of the flight. One person from the airport police stated that his 
office used to be informed about all incoming flights, but that in this case it 
had not been contacted in advance concerning the incoming US plane.34 
Apparently, Swedish officials insisted on accompanying the American team 
and the two detainees on their way to Cairo. Having reached Cairo Airport, 
the Swedish officers returned directly to Sweden while Al-Zery and Agiza 
were handed over to Egypt’s foreign intelligence service, the General 
Intelligence Service (EGIS).35 The Swedish government claimed that it 
insisted that its Egyptian counterpart should ensure that the two detainees 
were well treated and later it assured a committee of the United Nations on 
several occasions that it had no reason to believe that the two were being 
tortured or maltreated. The committee had serious reasons to mistrust the 
claims of the government, however, and finally stated sharply that Sweden 
had ‘committed a breach of its obligations’ by neither ‘disclosing to the 
Committee relevant information’ nor voicing its concerns.36 Both Al-Zery and 
Agiza were imprisoned in Egypt on terrorism charges. While Al-Zery was 
released in 2003 without trial, Agiza is still serving a 15-year prison sentence.37  
 
A parliamentary investigator conducted a probe into the case and concluded 
that the CIA operatives had violated Swedish law since they exercised police 
powers on Swedish soil and their activities subjected the prisoners to 
‘degrading and inhuman treatment.’38 While the investigation did not have 
any political or judicial consequences, the Swedish government agreed in June 
and September 2008 to pay compensation to both Al-Zery and Agiza (about 
330,000 each).39 The government also decided to reconsider both Al-Zery’s 
and Agiza’s applications for asylum which the Swedish Migration Board had 
earlier rejected. 
 
Germany 
 
Murat Kurnaz is a German resident with a Turkish passport who travelled to 
Pakistan in October 2001. During his trip, local authorities arrested him in 
mid-November 2001. He was then transferred to US custody in Kandahar, 
Afghanistan, before finally being imprisoned in Guantánamo Bay detention 
camp in January 2002.40 After his release from Guantánamo Bay in August 
                                                 
 
34  Grey (2006): 22-23. 
35  Grey (2006): 27. 
36  UN Human Rights Committee (2006). 
37  Grey (2006): 31; International Herald Tribune (2008a). 
38  Washington Post (2005a). 
39  International Herald Tribune (2008a). 
40  International Herald Tribune (2007a). 
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2006, Kurnaz claimed that there had been direct involvement by the German 
military during his stay in Kandahar. According to him, German soldiers 
‘slammed his head on the ground and kicked him, to the laughter of 
American soldiers watching.’41 Germany’s Defence Ministry first claimed that 
there were no soldiers active in that region but later admitted their presence 
and that they had contact with Kurnaz. The Ministry still denies any 
mistreatment, however. 
 
Confidential governmental documents published by the Süddeutsche Zeitung 
proved that staff members of Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service, the 
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), visited Kurnaz at Guantánamo Bay in 
September 2002 and interrogated him without finding any evidence that he 
might have been involved in any terrorist activity.42 According to Kurnaz, 
German authorities interrogated him there on two occasions.43 Media reports 
said that the US government was willing to release Kurnaz into German 
custody under strict security regulations and accused Germany’s then 
government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of blocking Kurnaz’s 
return.44 In particular, Schröders’ then Chief of Staff, Frank Walter 
Steinmeier, was criticized since he, as the Chief of Staff, was responsible for 
the intelligence services in Germany.45 Steinmeier and other members of the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) denied that the offer to release Kurnaz was a 
serious one by the US authorities.46 During a meeting (the so-called 
Präsidentenlage) of representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Chancellery, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution 
(Bundesverfassungsschutz) and the BND in October 2002, it was apparently 
decided that, if Kurnaz was released, he would be deported to Turkey. The 
official reason was that his right of residence had expired because Kurnaz did 
not report to the Aliens Registration Office as he was obliged to do.47 The 
decision to block Kurnaz’s return to Germany was emphasized in October 
2005 during another Präsidentenlage.48 However, in November 2005 the 
Administrative Court of Bremen (Kurnaz’s place of residence) decided that 
he should not have been deprived of his residence permit. 
                                                 
 
41  New York Times (2006b); International Herald Tribune (2007a).  
42  International Herald Tribune (2007a); Die Zeit (2007). 
43  New York Times (2006b). 
44  International Herald Tribune (2007a). 
45  See also Die Zeit (2007). Steinmeier is now the German Foreign Minister. 
46  Apparently, U.S. authorities would only release Kurnaz if the Germans would use him as an 
informant for intelligence purposes which was, according to Steinmeier, another reason for 
not taking the U.S. offer seriously. Cf. Die Zeit (2007). 
47  This is a very cynical argument given the fact that German authorities were well aware that 
Kurnaz was unable to get out of Guantánamo Bay to follow the administrative procedures 
in Germany. 
48  Die Zeit (2007). 
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The new Chancellor Angela Merkel was successful in December 2005 in 
obtaining the release of Kurnaz who returned to Germany in August 2006. 
He was formally cleared by the German government after his return to 
Germany.49 Kurnaz’s case was used by a US federal judge as an example that 
Guantanamao military tribunals violated prisoners’ right to a defence.50 In 
order to investigate the involvement of the BND in the US ‘war on terror’ a 
parliamentary committee was established. On 20 February 2006, the German 
Government provided the Committee of Inquiry (1. 
Untersuchungsausschuss) with a report ‘on events relating to the Iraq War 
and combating international terrorism’. Based on this, the German 
Parliament decided to investigate, among other issues, how the government 
had handled Kurnaz’s case. The mandate of the Committee is very broad, 
however, since it includes investigating several events and clarifying the 
political directions and the oversight of the activities of the BND, the BfV, the  
Federal Armed Forces Counterintelligence Office (MAD), the Federal 
Prosecutor General (GBA) and the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) in 
this context.51 
 
One of the key ‘events’ mentioned in the report refers to the CIA rendition 
flights and covert prisons operated by US authorities. The mandate of the 
Committee has already been extended twice. Given the complexity of the 
mandate, the Committee appointed an expert investigator in July 2007, 
mainly in order to speed up the committee’s work.52 The investigator provided 
a classified report in April 2008. According to media reports, the investigator 
stated that the former government was not directly involved in CIA renditions 
and that no secret prisons were located in Germany.53 But he also admitted 
that he had to rely on poor and incomplete information and that he expects 
much more facts and testimonies to emerge in the near future. Also, the focus 
of the report appears to be very narrow since it does not deal with, for 
example, US military flights using German airspace.54 As the first former 
Guantánamo detainee, Kurnaz testified before the US Congress on 20 May 
2008. 
 
The three cases show how well planned the CIA actions are. It can therefore 
be maintained that ‘extraordinary rendition requires coordinated action of 
different government agencies, regularized practices, and some degree of 
institutionalization. The CIA must hire chartered jets, set up dummy 
                                                 
 
49  New York Times (2006b). 
50  CBS NEWS (2008a).  
51  Deutscher Bundestag (2007a). 
52  Deutscher Bundestag (2007b). 
53  Süddeutsche Zeitung (2008a).  
54  Norddeutscher Rundfunk (2008).  
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companies, arrange to use U.S. military facilities, divert agents from their 
normal duties, find competent translators, develop relationships with non-
U.S. intelligence bureaus, pay support staff, and, of course, implement highly 
structured and precise procedures for keeping all of these actions secret.’55 
Given these complex preparations and procedures, some human rights 
observers queried whether the CIA could have rendered individuals without 
the state authorities of the respective countries knowing about this. 
Consequently, several European countries have been accused in reports 
provided by the CoE, the EP and some non-governmental organizations of 
‘turning a blind eye’ to some of these covert activities. This paper will focus 
on the most detailed investigations which are the ones provided by the 
European bodies. In particular, the CoE Reports have been described as 
particularly relevant and in-depth examinations exercised with legal rigor.56 
 
In November 2005, the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE) asked the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights to explore the serious allegations which were published in a 
Washington Post article and in a follow-up report by Human Rights Watch.57 
The publications suggested that Member States of the CoE might be involved 
in denying human rights to terrorism suspects and thus that European state 
governments might be involved in the CIA rendition and secret detention 
programme. Consequently, the Committee announced the nomination of a 
parliamentary rapporteur for the purpose of investigating the possible 
involvement of CoE Member States in this context.  
 
The investigation was led by the Swiss representative Dick Marty who 
published his first report on 12 June 2006 stating that the US had created a 
‘spider’s web’ of flight routes.58 His conclusions are sharp criticisms of 
European governments suggesting that their collusion allowed the ‘web’ to 
spread over Europe.59 The Report emphasized that the following fourteen 
member states seem to have participated, in various ways, in the CIA 
rendition and secret detention programme: Sweden, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
United Kingdom, Italy, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Germany, Turkey, Poland, Romania, Spain, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal and 
Greece.60 The ways in which European countries might be, or might have 
                                                 
 
55  Silkenat / Norman (2007): 544. 
56  Hakimi (2007): 443. 
57  Washington Post (2005b); Human Rights Watch (2005a). 
58  For a graphic image of this see:  
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc06/edoc10957-1.jpg . 
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been, involved in the rendition programme were described as follows. 
Member States were involved by: 
• ‘secretly detaining a person on European territory for an indefinite period 
of time, whilst denying that person’s basic human rights and failing to 
ensure procedural legal guarantees…’ (First Marty report, par. 10.1); 
• ‘capturing a person and handing the person over to the United States…’ 
(par. 10.2); 
• ‘permitting the unlawful transportation of detainees on civilian aircraft 
carrying  out ‘renditions’ operations…’ (par. 10.3); 
• ‘passing on information or intelligence to the United States where it was 
foreseeable that such material would be relied upon directly to carry out a 
‘rendition’ operation or to hold a person in secret detention’ (par. 10.4); 
• ‘making available civilian airports or military airfields as ‘staging points’ or 
platforms for rendition or other unlawful detainee transfer operations, 
whereby an aircraft prepares for and takes off on its operation from such a 
point’ (par. 10.7); or 
• ‘making available civilian airports or military airfields as ‘stopover points’ 
for rendition operations, whereby an aircraft lands briefly at such a point 
on the outward or homeward flight, for example to refuel’ (par. 10.8). 
 
On 11 June 2007, rapporteur Dick Marty published his follow-up report. It 
strengthens most of the evidence provided in the first report and concludes, 
for instance, that there is now factual evidence that the CIA operated secret 
detention centres for some years in Poland and Romania which were run 
‘directly and exclusively’ by the CIA.61 In contrast to the rendition campaign, 
however, Marty found that local staff had barely any meaningful contact with 
the prisoners. Instead, their job was to secure the outer premises or to provide 
logistical support. 
 
To explore in depth the legal aspects of the CIA rendition and detention 
programme, the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights asked 
the Venice Commission to explore the international legal obligations and 
duties of CoE Member States with respect to secret detention facilities and 
interstate transport of prisoners.62 In its report, the Venice Commission 
assessed the legality of the conduct, i.e. secret detentions and interstate 
transfers, without referring to individual cases.63 The report concludes that 
such conduct is incompatible with rights maintained in the European Charter 
of Human Rights (ECHR), an important cornerstone of international human 
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rights law.64 In detail, the Commission points out that any form of Member 
State participation in the CIA programme would violate the ECHR.65 The 
Venice Commission finally suggests certain steps that member states should 
take to ensure that the ECHR rights are sufficiently protected in this context.  
 
While the investigations in Europe unanimously describe both the rendition 
campaign and the secret detention campaign as illegal and a violation of 
human rights, high-ranking US state officials defend the use of renditions as a 
means of strategic importance66 in the ‘war on terror’. According to them, 
renditions ‘take terrorists out of action, and save lives’67. Interestingly, this 
quotation by US State Secretary Condoleezza Rice points out the difference 
between (formerly known types of) renditions and extraordinary renditions: 
the purpose of extraordinary rendition is to withdraw a suspect. While earlier 
renditions might be described as ‘renditions to justice’68 – a term which 
implies the aim to transfer a suspect so that he/she can be put on trial –, 
extraordinary renditions are used for persons whom the US government 
perceives as a threat to national security. Such security concerns, however, 
might lead to indifference concerning the subsequent prosecution or 
detention of the person rendered.69  
 
 
Detention camps, black-site prisons and the discussion about torture  
 
Arguably, the purpose of the extraordinary rendition campaign is to bring 
terrorist suspects to a location – such as an overseas military facility – in which 
they can be secretly interrogated about their activities. The rendition 
campaign is therefore closely interwoven with US military detention camps 
such as Guantánamo Bay and secret prisons.  
 
Detention programme 
 
Already during the Reagan administration in the 1990s, the CIA had about 
half a dozen terrorists in custody at any time and usually kept them in foreign 
prisons, mostly in Egypt and Jordan.70 But just two months after the attacks of 
11 September 2001, CIA paramilitary teams working with foreign intelligence 
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services had arrested dozens of people who supposedly had knowledge of the 
forthcoming attacks on the United States. Apparently, most of the victims of 
the secret detention programme since autumn 2001 were finally brought to 
Guantánamo Bay, the US military base on Cuba. The US military opened a 
prison called Camp X-Ray there in January 2002 and transported some of the 
prisoners captured in Afghanistan to it. The conditions of imprisonment at 
Camp X-Ray have frequently been described since then and the photographs 
of prisoners in wire cages (which do not allow for any privacy since they are 
see-through) were published all over the globe. Later, prisoners were moved 
into Camp Delta while Camp X-Ray was closed. Children up to 16 years 
were held in a separate detention facility called Camp Iguana. Those 
imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay are detained for the purpose of interrogation 
in order to secure information on the al Qaeda network and to prevent 
possible future terrorist attacks. 
 
In June 2005, the UN special rapporteur on terrorism, Manfred Nowak, 
accused the US of secretly detaining terrorist suspects in various secret 
locations around the world, notably aboard prison ships in the Indian Ocean 
region.71 A Washington Post article of 2 November 2005 claimed that the 
CIA ran secret prisons in eight countries.72 In particular, Thailand and two 
Eastern European countries were mentioned as host countries.73 Shortly after 
this article was published, Human Rights Watch suggested that the Mihail 
Kolgalniceanu military base in Romania and a Polish intelligence service 
training facility close to Szymany Airport were the locations of the two ‘black 
sites’ in Eastern Europe which were mentioned in the Washington Post 
article.74 The CIA was operating such black sites according to a classified 
presidential directive of 17 September 2001. The locations of most black-site 
prisons remain unclear, however. According to the British human rights 
organisation Reprieve, detainees are held in camps in countries such as 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Egypt, Morocco and South Africa. Also, ships 
have been used as floating prisons.75 
 
One secret prison that became officially public in February 2008 is the 
detainment facility on the Island of Diego Garcia, an overseas territory of the 
United Kingdom in the Indian Ocean. The territory is the international legal 
                                                 
 
71  BBC News (2005); cf. Reprieve (2007): p. 11ff. 
72  Washington Post (2005b). 
73  Washington Post (2005b). 
74  Human Rights Watch (2005a). The allegations were later repeated in the Second Marty 
Report. Cf. Guardian (2007b). 
75  See the map printed in The Guardian (2009b). Further allegations have been made that the 
US has used certain of its own military facilities abroad (for example, the Coleman Barracks 
close to Mannheim, Germany) but have been investigated without any real legal rigor 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung (2009)).  
17 
responsibility of the UK and there is a small group of UK military personnel 
on the island, but the island is also home to a large US military base.76 As 
early as 2004, a retired US general, Barry McCaffrey, twice publicly 
mentioned that the Island of Diego Garcia is one of the camps used by US 
authorities to detain suspects.77 The UK government always denied any use of 
Diego Garcia in the context of rendition flights, however. Only increasing 
public pressure and the serious allegations expressed, among others, in the 
Second Marty Report, led the UK Parliament to start an investigation in 
October 2007. As part of its inquiry into British overseas territories, the 
Foreign Affairs Committee pursued the allegations. While it did not provide 
any evidence of the use of Diego Garcia facilities as a ‘black-site’ prison, the 
UK government had to admit in early 2008 that the island had indeed been 
used for refuelling stops during two US rendition flights in 2002.78 In reply to 
a request under the Freedom of Information Act by MP Andrew Tyrie, the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office maintained that the US government 
denied any further use of UK territory, the Overseas Territories or the Crown 
Dependencies for rendition flights.79  
 
Treatment and condition of detainees 
 
Only in May 2006 did the Pentagon release a list of detainees who had so far 
been held at Guantánamo Bay detention facilities.80 All in all, there have been 
more than 700 prisoners at Guantánamo. On 31 January 2007, 275 prisoners 
were left, according to the US Department of Defense.81 Recent figures 
suggest that ‘about 255’ prisoners are still held there.82 The prisoners can be 
divided into three categories: ‘one, those who have already been cleared for 
release or transfer but cannot be returned home because they would likely 
face torture or other abuse; two, those the United States wants to try; and 
three, those who the United States says are too dangerous to release yet 
cannot be tried.’83 
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While some of the prisoners were arrested ‘on the battlefield’ in Afghanistan, 
others were arrested in countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Gambia 
and were certainly not soldiers. They are not treated as ‘ordinary’ criminals 
either, since they were imprisoned in a war-like context. The US government 
used the unusual circumstances to deny those prisoners the status of 
‘prisoners of war’ (POWs) under the Third Geneva Convention which would 
mean that they would have to be treated according to international human 
rights law and given proper legal assistance.84 Neither are they considered to 
be civilians under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Instead, they are seen as 
‘enemy combatants’ and are held incommunicado, i.e. they are denied 
contact with a lawyer or are not given access to a court.85 This procedure is in 
sharp contrast to international regulations such as the ECHR which 
emphasizes the importance of the lawfulness of a detention. Based on this, in 
a recent case heard by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) it was 
maintained that reasons of national security are no excuse for national 
authorities to avoid court control of the lawfulness of any detention.86  
 
Fitzpatrick further suggests that this form of detention ‘may contravene 
human rights norms because of the debilitating psychological effects.’87 This is 
even more likely given the fact that most of the prisoners were subjected to so-
called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ such as waterboarding, sleep 
deprivation and sensory deprivation.88 For this purpose, the CIA uses a 
building inside the military complex at Guantánamo Bay (the other parts of 
the facility are run by the US Department of Defense).89 In his speech on 6 
September 2006, the then President Bush justified the existence of such 
prisons by arguing that it could save the lives of US citizens.90  
 
In the same speech, Bush also acknowledged the existence of CIA secret 
prisons outside US territory and in addition to the detention facilities at 
Guantánamo Bay. He admitted that individuals who pose ‘a significant threat, 
or may have intelligence that we and our allies need to have to prevent new 
attacks’ were moved to ‘an environment where they can be held secretly, 
questioned by experts and - when appropriate - prosecuted for terrorist 
acts.’91 These particular individuals are categorized by the US government as 
so-called High Value Detainees (HVD) which is a particular category of 
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prisoners distinguished by the US government. In such black-site prisons, 
detainees are subject to an ‘alternative set of procedures’.92  
 
As mentioned earlier, however, the end points of renditions are not only 
black-site prisons run by the CIA. Some people have also been rendered to 
states whose security authorities are well known for the use of robust 
interrogation techniques and torture such as Egypt, Pakistan and Morocco. In 
April 2008, Human Rights Watch published a report indicating more than a 
dozen cases of prisoners who had been sent to Jordan for torture.93 An 
unpublished memorandum of 13 March 2002 entitled ‘The President’s 
Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captive Terrorists to the Control 
and Custody of Foreign Nations’ apparently constitutes the authoritative act 
for such a transfer.94 In those prisons abroad, it seems to be common practice 
that the interrogation of terrorist suspects is conducted by local staff who are 
prepared with questions from the foreign intelligence service. This procedure 
allows the sending state to claim that it was not directly involved in any illegal 
treatment of prisoners. Indeed, the state which transferred the individual in 
question does not necessarily know about the interrogation techniques used 
by the local interrogators.95 However, it has chosen the host country because 
of its reputation for using harsh interrogation techniques – a practice which is 
sometimes referred to as ‘outsourcing torture’96.  
 
‘Enhanced interrogation techniques’ and the use of torture 
 
After denying that US officers interrogated terrorist suspects by means of 
torture, the US government finally admitted the use of coercive interrogation 
techniques in 2006.97 In a public speech, the then President Bush maintained 
that a few key leaders from the two political parties knew about this 
‘alternative procedure’.98 When such coercive interrogation techniques were 
used by the CIA, he said, the interrogations were overseen by the CIA’s 
Inspector General and were reviewed by the US Department of Justice and 
CIA lawyers. The interrogators and other people involved in the procedure 
were carefully selected and experienced CIA officials who also received 
specialized training, according to Bush. He vehemently denied, however, that 
this could be interpreted as torture.99 Instead, the US government referred to 
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such instruments as ‘enhanced interrogation techniques.’ However, according 
to the Second Marty Report this term is ‘essentially an euphemism for some 
kind of torture’.100 Only at the end of Bush’s presidency would a top 
administration official publicly state that the US military had tortured a 
Guantánamo detainee. Susan Crawford, the convening authority of military 
commissions who oversees trials, charges and the sentencing of Guantánamo 
Bay detainees, concluded that Mohammed al-Qahtani’s overall treatment was 
coercive and abusive and must be described as torture.101 
 
The means used by the US government to fight terrorism include the use of 
coercive interrogation methods such as sleep deprivation, forced nudity, 
painful stress positions and the use of dogs.102 The most controversial 
technique in recent media debates, however, is waterboarding. This term 
refers to a practice that is often described as mock drowning: the detainee is 
usually bound to a plank slanted towards the floor while his face is covered 
with cellophane or a similar material. The interrogators then pour water over 
the detainee’s face until he feels he is suffocating or drowning.103 Some 
observers found that waterboarding is not only mock drowning but that it is 
rather ‘… real drowning that simulates death. That is, the victim experiences 
the sensations of drowning: struggle, panic, breath-holding, swallowing, 
vomiting, taking water into the lungs and, eventually, the same feeling of not 
being able to breathe that one experiences after being punched in the gut. 
The main difference is that the drowning process is halted. According to those 
who have studied waterboarding's effects, it can cause severe psychological 
trauma, such as panic attacks, for years.’104 Arguably, waterboarding is a form 
of torture and is illegal under many domestic laws, including US law.105 The 
technique is also prohibited by the International Convention Against Torture 
(ICAT) and the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) which both prohibit torture as well as inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. The intention of the international conventions and 
treaties against the use of torture is that the prohibition is non-derogable, i.e. 
it is a right which cannot be the subject of suspension even during periods of 
national emergency. This is also the interpretation of the ECtHR which 
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conceives the prohibition of torture as a peremptory norm in international 
law.106 
 
To circumvent legal problems, the US government redefined torture, or in 
other words it narrowed its own definition of torture, as maintained by a 
leaked memorandum of the US Department of Justice Office of the Legal 
Counsel in August 2002.107 According to this Memorandum, torture is limited 
to physical pain ‘equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious 
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even 
death’ or mental suffering that results in ‘significant psychological harm of 
significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.’ 
 
In 2007, allegations were made that videotapes, which would show harsh 
interrogations of detainees in secret prisons, had been destroyed by the CIA. 
The allegations were later substantiated and the CIA admitted that the tapes 
were destroyed in November 2005 based on an order by the CIA’s head of 
clandestine services, Jose A. Rodriguez Jr.108 Only in February 2008, did 
Michael Hayden, the Director of the CIA, state that the Agency used 
waterboarding against three ‘enemy combatants’, namely Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Hussein (better known as Abu 
Zubaida) and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri while they were in US custody at a 
secret detention site.109 He ensured that the technique was only used in 2002 
and 2003 and is no longer used. On the same day, US Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey announced that there would not be a criminal investigation 
into the CIA’s use of waterboarding on terrorist suspects given the legal basis 
of the actions.110 Instead, the US Justice Department announced an 
investigation by its internal ethics office into the department’s legal approval 
for the use of waterboarding on terrorist suspects by the CIA.111 A report by 
the bipartisan Senate Armed Services Committee issued in December 2008 
accuses the former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his deputies of 
direct responsibility for the harsh treatment of detainees at Guantánamo Bay 
and criticizes that their policies also allowed further abuses like the ones in 
Abu Ghraib.112 While the government had been claiming that such abuses 
were the actions of a few ‘bad apples’ among military staff, the Committee 
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argued that there was a direct relation between the rationale of the 
government’s policy and the abuses.113 
 
Respectively in December 2007 and February 2008, the US Congress and 
Senate approved an intelligence authorization bill that would have banned the 
CIA from using aggressive interrogation techniques by limiting its potential 
methods to the ones outlined in a US Army field manual on interrogations.114 
Former President Bush, however, used his presidential power to veto this bill 
claiming that such techniques are very valuable tools in the ‘war on terror’.115 
In the meantime, it was revealed that military interrogators had also been 
authorised to use harsh interrogation techniques by the Justice Department in 
2003.116 The Defense Department restricted the use of interrogation methods 
through the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, however, which only allows the 
use of methods set out in the Army Field Manual on Intelligence 
Interrogation, which bans coercive interrogations.117  
 
President Obama apparently put an end to this legal limbo by outlawing 
waterboarding and other coercive interrogation techniques in one of his first 
executive orders. He renewed the US commitment to the Geneva Convention 
on the treatment of detainees and, consequently, the CIA will have to follow 
the US army field manual on interrogations. Also, announcements by key 
personnel of the Obama government signal a clear policy change in this 
matter. For example, both the new US Attorney General, Eric Holder, and 
the new CIA Director, Leon Panetta, stated that they conceive of 
waterboarding as torture.118 
 
Within secret prisons, and in particular in the case of Guantánamo Bay, there 
is evidence and very strong indications that not only US authorities have 
interrogated detainees but that European security officials have interrogated 
detainees themselves or accompanied interrogations by the US authorities. 
Examples of this are the involvement of the BND in the case of Kurnaz 
(mentioned above) and the allegations of complicity in torture against British 
intelligence and security officials.119 Certainly not all European states have 
been involved and only a few might have sent their own staff, but others 
apparently asked foreign interrogators to ask questions on their behalf. The 
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latter practice raises issues of the state responsibility of European states which 
will be discussed in the following section. Also, given the increasing 
international exchange of information and intelligence, European 
governments ought to tackle serious questions such as a) whether to allow the 
use of information (e.g. in order to prevent a terrorist attack or as a basis for 
the surveillance of individuals) gathered through torture and b) how they can 
know under which circumstances any information has been gathered. The 
political discussion concerning these questions in the UK had been intense 
until the House of Lords published a strong position unconditionally in favour 
of prohibiting the use of torture, based on the common law tradition as well 
as European and international law obligations.120 
 
Former President Bush announced the closure of Guantánamo Bay on several 
occasions since 2006, and the US State Department emphasized a couple of 
times that the government is indeed working towards this aim.121 In January 
2008, even Michael Mullen, the current US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, pledged the shutdown of the Guantánamo Bay Camp.122 By mid-
January 2008, however, there were 275 detainees left at Guantánamo, 
according to an announcement by the Pentagon.123 Currently, the 
Guantánamo Bay Detention Facility is still operational. The US government 
even built a new high-security prison (Camp 6) in Guantánamo in 
2006/2007. According to a New York Times article of 21 October 2008 the 
Bush administration decided not to close Guantánamo at any time soon due 
to ‘too many legal and political risks’ that the closure would involve.124  
 
In one of his first executive orders, however, President Barack Obama ordered 
the closure of not only the Guantánamo Bay prison, but all detention facilities 
which the CIA currently operates worldwide within a year.125 Nonetheless, the 
process of closing the detention facilities at Guantánamo Bay seems less easy 
than expected and the actual closure might be delayed due to various 
challenges.126  
                                                 
 
120  Geyer (2007): 4-5. See also European Parliament (2006a); House of Lords (2005).  
121  Times Online (2006a); BBC News (2007a). 
122  Süddeutsche Zeitung (2008b). 
123  Süddeutsche Zeitung (2008b). 
124  New York Times (2008e). 
125  The White House, President Barack Obama (2009). 
126  Times Online (2009a); New York Times (2008f). 
24  
One reason for that is that most of the trials against Guantánamo detainees 
have not yet started and, in fact, until the summer of 2008 there had not been 
a single trial of anyone imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay.127 In June 2008, the 
first trial started against Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other detainees 
accused of plotting al-Qaida's 2001 attack and this is still ongoing. Although a 
2008 directive by the US Supreme Court urged judges to set dates for the 
processes involving Guantánamo Bay detainees due to the long detention 
periods they have already experienced, legal and military experts do not 
expect quick trials, partly because they might involve the death penalty and 
claims of torture.128 Moreover, it appears that the Justice Department has 
difficulties in providing sufficient evidence to hold detainees at Guantánamo 
Bay because the cases rely on intelligence material whose credibility is 
unclear.129  
 
The first conviction against a Guantánamo detainee was obtained in the trial 
against the personal driver of Osama bin Laden, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, 
which began on 21 July 2008. Within less than three weeks, he was found 
guilty of providing material support for terrorism through his association with 
Osama bin Laden and other members of al Qaeda and was sentenced to five 
and a half years’ imprisonment.130 In November 2008, 18 of the Guantánamo 
detainees were facing war crimes charges.131  
 
With respect to the detainees at Guantánamo Bay who will probably not be 
charged at all, the key problem appears to be that detainees from countries 
such as Algeria, China, Libya, Somalia, Tajikistan and other states fear 
repatriation because of the torture they might have to face in their home 
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countries.132 Following the international ban on refoulement – which can be 
described as ‘the absolute prohibition on forced return to torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment’133 – the US government is 
not allowed to return them under such circumstances. In this context, a 
federal court decided in October 2008 to remove the ‘enemy combatant’ 
designation of 17 Chinese Uighurs imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay since 
2001. They had been already cleared for release in 2004, but the US 
government stated that they would remain in Guantánamo Bay because they 
might face persecution if returned to China. Judge Ricardo Urbina decided 
that they had to be freed immediately and given parole status in the US. The 
US government reacted angrily stating that the group might pose a security 
threat to the US and that this case might set a precedent for further 
Guantánamo detainees to seek US entry. It therefore filed an emergency 
motion and a federal appeals court granted its request and blocked the 
planned release so that the government would have more time to argue 
against the plan.134 
 
Arguably, some European governments have been involved in this aspect of 
the ‘war on terror’ insofar as they have been very reluctant to take their 
former residents back. However, there are now no European citizens left at 
Guantánamo Bay, also thanks to public pressure in European societies.135 
Countries such as the UK, Spain, Denmark, Belgium and Turkey have 
resettled former Guantánamo detainees.136 The Special Representative of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCEPA) had emphasized in her 2006 and 2007 reports the 
responsibility of OSCE and NATO states to facilitate the return of their 
nationals from Guantánamo Bay.137 For European governments, the following 
question remains: what will happen to the roughly 60 detainees who are 
found completely innocent and have already been cleared for release but 
whose countries of origin do not respect the international ban on torture? The 
European Parliament passed a resolution in this context which calls for the 
resettlement of Guantánamo detainees from third states where the prisoners 
would have to fear torture in their own country.138 On 11 December 2008, in 
an open letter to his EU counterparts, Portugal’s Foreign Minister offered to 
grant asylum to those detainees who cannot return to their countries of origin 
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subject to the condition that other EU countries would do the same.139 Until 
that date, only the Albanian government had agreed to accept a few of these 
prisoners.140 The initiative by the Portuguese government has led to intense 
domestic political discussions in some EU countries. In particular, the 
German government is split on the issue. While the Minister of the Interior 
rejects the idea of accepting former Guantánamo detainees since they could 
potentially prove to be a danger, the Foreign Minister indicated that the 
government is considering accepting detainees in individual cases. A few 
governments – such as Austria and the Netherlands - reject the notion of 
taking any former detainees since they see the resettlement of Guantánamo 
detainees as a responsibility for the US government only, while others such as 
Finland are pushing for an EU-wide solution and are currently looking into 
the legal and political challenges.141 Behind closed doors, the issue was 
discussed at the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting 
on 26 January 2009, but the Member States did not reach an agreement.142  
 
 
Preliminary conclusion 
 
Silkenat and Norman argue convincingly that the establishment of a spider 
network and the secret prison system has implied a certain level of 
bureaucratization and that the violation of human rights standards, contrary 
to US law, has become institutionalized.143 This does not necessarily mean 
that, even within the CIA, all officials have been aware of what was going on. 
Tyler Drumheller, the former chief of the CIA’s Europe division, maintained 
in the context of black-site prisons and renditions: ‘If they're doing it in 
Europe, I would have known. But if they were taking people out of Europe, I 
wouldn't have known.’144 The testimonies of rendered individuals make it very 
difficult to believe, however, that the programme could be kept secret for a 
long time. Rather, there seems to be a degree organisation behind both the 
extraordinary rendition campaign and the secret detention programme. While 
it might have been possible for the CIA to act completely undercover in 
Europe, cases such as those of Sweden and Italy suggest that the CIA co-
operated with European state authorities or that the latter were at least 
informed about its activities. 
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The rendition campaign should be understood as an exceptional instrument 
of counter-terrorist policing. This term refers to measures intended to prevent 
or to fight terrorism proactively. That includes, among others, police, 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies at the local, national and 
international level. The rendition campaign mirrors the increasing merger of 
external and internal realms of security. State borders no longer provide an 
absolute framework for the provision of security. The CIA is a US agency, 
some of the aircraft under suspicion were let by private companies, the 
detainees originated from a variety of countries, mostly asylum-seekers or 
refugees who were then brought either to detention camps run by the CIA or 
states where local security authorities interviewed them and they were 
imprisoned. Often, as seen in the cases of Italy and Sweden explored above, 
national authorities were involved (e.g. border police and immigration 
authorities or intelligence services).  
28  
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3. Reactions, the involvement and 
 ignorance of European states 
Having sketched the existing jigsaw pieces of the CIA programme and the 
various links to European state authorities, it seems necessary to ask what 
actions the European governments have taken in reaction to the extraordinary 
rendition and secret detention campaign. This section will focus on how, if at 
all, some European nation states and the European Union reacted to the 
rendition campaign, the detention programme and the accusations of torture. 
There is no scope for a detailed comparative analysis here and therefore the 
objective of the argument will be to illustrate general patterns of reactions 
while now and then emphasizing individual cases.  
 
While organisations such as Amnesty International recommended that all 
Council of Europe member states allegedly involved in cases of rendition 
should initiate an inquiry, this has hardly been the case so far.145 In general, it 
can be observed that the reactions in Europe were very different in nature. 
While in some European states there seem to have been no or very little 
public discussion, in others both legal and political responses are on their way.  
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We can distinguish at least four types of reactions by state authorities: 
• investigation by national parliaments, 
• investigation by governmental bodies, 
• legal response by judicial authorities, and 
• no official reaction beyond rhetoric. 
 
The starting point for this research is the questionnaire146 that was sent out by 
the TDIP Committee of the EP to European governments and which 
contained the question whether the countries had established a special 
committee concerning the allegations about the CIA secret detention 
programme. According to the replies, only the German Parliament had 
established such a committee.147 This does not exclude the possibility that 
standing committees have been involved in investigations, of course, but the 
small number already sheds light on the poor reactions by governments and 
parliaments given the complicated issue. In the following I will highlight some 
replies by European state bodies to the allegations of tolerating or assisting 
CIA flights in their territory or airspace. 
 
 
Investigations by national parliaments 
 
A few European countries, such as Sweden, Romania and the UK, have 
initiated a parliamentary investigation concerning extraordinary rendition 
flights. In Germany, an investigation is still ongoing. The investigations differ 
both in terms of their mandate and rigour. Some other national parliaments, 
such as the Belgian, have dealt with issues related to potential extraordinary 
rendition cases, secret detention facilities or other features concerning the 
current intelligence co-operation with the US authorities through individual 
questions raised by Members of Parliament. 
 
In the case of Sweden, a parliamentary investigation into a particular case of 
rendition was carried out (see the summary of the Swedish case above). The 
cases of Mohammed al-Zery and Ahmed Agiza were investigated by the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Swedish Parliament consequently 
published a report focusing on the involvement of the Swedish government in 
these issues. According to media reports, there are allegations of more CIA 
flights in Sweden which have not yet been investigated.  
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The Romanian Parliament investigated the claim that a secret prison existed 
on Romanian territory. The head of the investigation committee, Norica 
Nicolai, emphasized the lack of any evidence that the CIA operated a prison 
in Romania or used facilities to interrogate people on Romanian territory.148  
 
In Germany, a parliamentary investigation is ongoing as was briefly described 
earlier. Given the complexity of its mandate, in July 2007 the investigative 
committee appointed an expert investigator. The investigator argued in his 
2008 report to the investigation committee that an investigation could only be 
completely successful if the US authorities would cooperate and provide 
sufficient information.149 Together with other current allegations against the 
BND, the political pressure is high to reform the standing parliamentary 
committee to control the German intelligence services (Parlamentarisches 
Kontrollgremium) and to extend its mandate.150  
 
Concerning the UK, the First Marty Report stated that although Parliament 
had not yet initiated an inquiry into the possible British participation in 
human rights abuses committed by the US in the ‘war on terror’, it had 
stimulated a public debate through various activities. In July 2008, the 
Foreign Affairs Select Commmittee, an all-party parliamentary body, urged 
the government to investigate the US claims that Great Britain had not been 
used for renditions.151 Emphasizing a ‘legal and moral obligation’, it also 
requested that the government should explore the US government’s use of 
interrogation techniques such as waterboarding. In clear terms, the 
Committee argued that ‘(g)iven the clear differences in definition, the UK can 
no longer rely on US assurances that it does not use torture, and we 
recommend that the government does not rely on such assurances in the 
future.’152 Finally, it asked the government to investigate allegations that the 
UK had ’outsourced‘ the interrogation of six terror suspects to Pakistan's ISI 
intelligence agency, where they were interrogated and possibly tortured by 
British intelligence officers.153 
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Investigations by governments 
 
In Denmark, opposition parties asked for a parliamentary inquiry into 
allegations that Danish airspace and airports had been used by the CIA in the 
context of renditions which the government and its ally refused. A 
documentary called ‘The CIA’s Danish Connections’ was broadcast in 
January 2008 and provided new evidence that Narsarsuaq Airport in 
Greenland had been used for CIA flights. The Danish government then 
promised publicly to discuss this issue with the US government but did not 
allow an investigation.154 
 
In France, the Attorney General of Bobigny commenced an investigation on 
20 January 2006 into an aircraft bearing the serial number N50BH, which 
supposedly stopped on 20 July 2005 at Le Bourget Airport. The Attorney 
General will explore whether this aircraft, coming from Oslo, was used by the 
CIA for the transport of prisoners and whether French authorities were aware 
of this. The French newspaper Le Figaro pointed to a second suspicious 
aircraft which supposedly stopped at Brest Airport in March 2002,155 but so 
far there has been no official investigation into this case. It is, however, being 
investigated by the Canadian authorities since it supposedly originated there. 
 
Parallel to the parliamentary investigation, the Romanian government also 
conducted an investigation into the allegations of hosting a secret prison in its 
country. In a letter to the European Commission, a Romanian government 
spokeswoman stated that the committee of inquiry found that the allegations 
were ‘unfounded’.156 The current government seems to be reluctant to discuss 
the topic any further. The Defence Minister Ioan Mircea Pascu called it ‘a 
closed subject’, according to an article in the International Herald Tribune on 
24 February 2008.157  
 
 
Legal responses 
 
Concerning individual cases of extraordinary renditions and former detainees 
of US detention camps and secret prisons, legal trials are pending in several 
European countries such as Spain, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Portugal. 
 
A Spanish attorney investigated whether CIA flight stopovers violated human 
rights law. According to media reports, the Canary Islands and Palma de 
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Mallorca were used as a destination for rendition crews after conducting 
rendition operations, and as a location where logistical meetings could take 
place in relation to specific operations.158 The government claims that it did 
not have any knowledge about this. In February 2008, the National Court 
also inquired why the Spanish government had updated a bilateral defence 
treaty with its US counterpart briefly after the 9/11 attacks which gives US 
aircraft more flexibility when landing at the US bases in Spain.159 The Spanish 
newspaper El País published several articles and official documents in 
December 2008 which indicate that the US government formally requested 
assistance from the Spanish Foreign Ministry. One leaked letter of 10 January 
2002 by a high-ranking official of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Miguel Aguirre de Cárcer, to the then Foreign Affairs Minister, Josep Piqué 
and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Miquel Nadal, explains that the 
US Embassy in Madrid asked the Spanish government to permit stopovers in 
Spanish airports for long-term flights in cases of emergency or under 
extraordinary circumstances.160 The US explicitly maintained that the security 
of people being transported would be its own responsibility. The letter also 
suggests that the US had made similar arrangements with other countries. 
This request by the US was granted by the Spanish government within less 
than 24 hours.161 An information note by the Spanish Section of the 
Permanent Hispanic-North American Committee further suggests that the 
Spanish officials involved wanted to keep the (potential) landings as far away 
from the public as possible, since they suggested using airports in remote 
areas.162 The brief letter also considers the possibility that European persons 
might be on board those flights and the potential legal consequences that this 
would have. 
 
In the Second Marty Report, the governmental authorities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are highlighted as the only ones which have acknowledged their 
responsibility for involvement in a case of extraordinary rendition. The case 
involved six Algerians, four of whom were citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
two with residence status in the country. They were arrested in Sarajevo by 
Bosnian police officers and handed over to US military forces at the Butmir 
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base on 17 January 2002.163 The six men were then flown to Guantánamo Bay 
where they remain detained without trial. The Bosnian Human Rights 
Chamber maintained the illegal nature of these detentions.164 The authorities 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina were put under great pressure by the US Government, 
which threatened to sever diplomatic relations unless the six men were 
arrested on terrorism charges.165  
 
In Germany, a court in Munich issued international arrest warrants against 13 
suspected CIA officials involved in a rendition case of Khaled el-Masri.166 In 
Italy, a trial in Milan is pending against several CIA officials and staff 
members of the Italian intelligence service (see the summary of the Italian 
case). In Portugal, the Attorney General Cândida Almeida announced on 5 
February 2007 that there would be an investigation into the stopovers by CIA 
flights which supposedly transferred people to secret prisons.167 The 
investigation is based on allegations by MEP Ana Gomes concerning human 
rights violations and illegal activities. In March 2008, the UK human rights 
organization Reprieve published a list of more that 700 prisoners who had 
supposedly been transferred to a CIA prison through Portuguese airspace.168 
At least one of the 28 aircraft under investigation landed on Portuguese 
territory, according to Reprieve. In Switzerland, a criminal probe into the use 
of Swiss airspace to fly the kidnapped imam Abu Omar from Italy to 
Germany started in February 2007. But the case was suspended in November 
2007, according to the spokeswoman of the Swiss Federal Prosecutor’s 
Office.169  
 
Overall, judicial proceedings are often hampered by the excessive secrecy of 
counter-terrorism activities. One example of this is a recent ruling by the 
English High Court concerning the case of Binyam Mohamed, a former UK 
resident who was subject to an extraordinary rendition and is currently 
imprisoned in Guantánamo Bay. His lawyers had asked the Court to release 
to the public certain documents provided by the US government concerning 
his treatment during the detention period. The British Foreign Secretary 
David Milband had issued a public interest immunity certificate to prevent 
their disclosure. According to the judges, he had argued that the release of the 
documents would jeopardize the UK’s national security because in that case 
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the US had threatened to stop sharing intelligence about terrorism with the 
UK. The judges decided not to overrule the certificate, but sharply critisized 
both Miliband and the US government for making such a threat. After the 
judgment became public, the Foreign Minister argued in an emergency 
statement to MPs that the US had not made a ‘threat’ as such, but that the 
government had only warned Britain that the release of the documents would 
be ‘likely to result in serious damage to US national security and could harm 
existing intelligence information-sharing between [the] two governments.’170  
 
 
No investigative reaction 
 
This is surely the most typical reaction both by governmental and 
parliamentary bodies in the member states of the Council of Europe. After the 
reports by the CoE and the TDIP, non-governmental organizations and 
journalists continued to collect evidence of CIA flights in Europe which might 
have been used in the context of extraordinary renditions and for secret 
prisons in Eastern Europe. However, the state authorities remain very hesitant 
or clearly reluctant to open investigations into these allegations. As illustrated 
by some of the cases mentioned above, even in countries where the authorities 
have started an investigation, this is often hampered for various reasons.  
 
US governmental authorities have stated on several occasions that the CIA 
programme has been conducted in a way that respects the sovereignty of the 
countries involved.171 To respect the sovereignty of a country in this context, 
however, implies that certain European governmental authorities must have 
known about the activities. This is even more worrying given the findings of 
the Venice Commission that some individuals were transferred completely 
outside any legal process.172  
 
The illustration of the three monkeys which do not see, do not hear and do 
not speak might visualize the three different types of groups involved: 
pretending to be blind seems to be the reaction by operational staff at the 
airports or military airfields, for example. It is very difficult to see how the US 
agencies could have acted in many cases of rendition without the consent of 
national officials, i.e. airport staff as well as members of the police, customs 
and intelligence services.173 The three cases of Sweden, Italy and Germany 
which are described above illustrate some of the forms in which local 
authorities might have been involved in renditions. Other reports such as the 
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ones by the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and several human 
rights organizations point out further possible interactions. 
 
Pretending to be deaf seems to be the reaction by certain European 
governments. It is obvious that European governments tend only to admit 
what has been published so far anyway and otherwise ensure that they did not 
know about any CIA flights or its secret detention programme.  
 
Finally, the silent monkey might refer to those Parliaments which remain 
surprisingly passive. This is remarkable given the general mandate of 
controlling the executive which all parliaments in Europe have. The CIA 
programme touches upon issues of human rights and individual freedoms. If 
there is any serious allegation or reason to be suspicious about governmental 
behaviour or possible involvement in this context, it is arguably the 
responsibility of a parliament to use its control and oversight powers in this 
context.  
 
 
The European Union 
 
After Dick Marty had started his investigation into the CIA detention 
programme for the CoE, the European Parliament (EP) quickly decided to 
follow up on this issue and the report was published in January 2007. 
Basically, this report is an updated version of the First Marty Report. Since 
the EP report was published, it remains unclear how exactly the EP is going 
to follow up on this issue. The report also made it very clear that co-operation 
with other EU bodies in order to collect information did not run very 
smoothly or, in other words, some EU bodies seem to be reluctant to assist 
the work of the EP for unknown reasons. At the beginning of 2008, the EP 
was still discussing internally whether and, if so, how to follow up the TDIP 
report.174 The possibility that a follow-up will take place is quite small at the 
time of writing, however: in December 2008 the Conservative and Socialist 
groups in the EP rejected a request by the Liberals, the Greens and the 
Communist groups to debate the CIA extraordinary rendition programme 
and Guantánamo in a plenary session of the EP that month.175 The 
Commission, namely the then EU Commissioner for Justice and Home 
Affairs, Franco Frattini, urged the governments of Poland and Romania in 
July 2007 to conduct an in-depth investigation into the EP Report’s 
allegations against them concerning their complicity in rendition flights and 
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the tolerating of detention facilities, but as of spring 2008 neither government 
had replied.176  
 
With respect to the Guantánamo Bay detainment facility, the EU has stated 
on several occasions that the conditions in the camp have to be improved and 
that it has to be closed as soon as possible. For example, Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, the European Commissioner in charge of External Relations and 
Neighbourhood Policy, stated in 2006 that ‘every person who has been 
detained must enjoy a status under international law and not to be detained 
arbitrarily and to receive due process and fair trail. No one should be subject 
to 'incomunicado' detention and the international committee of the Red Cross 
must always be allowed access to detained persons wherever they may be.’177 
The European Parliament passed a resolution on Guantánamo in 2006 calling 
for the closure of the Guantánamo Bay detention facility, the treatment of 
detainees in accordance with international humanitarian law and the setting 
up of fair and public trials.178  
 
 
Preliminary Conclusion 
 
Little has so far been done by European governments and parliaments to shed 
more light on CIA rendition activities. The involvement of states remains 
rather unclear, although the allegations are very serious. All governments 
should have, however, an interest in clarifying the allegations. If they (might) 
indirectly profit from the programme by gaining information that is gathered 
in one of the secret prisons or military camps, they have to be aware of the 
circumstances under which this information was gained. Of course, there is 
little reason to believe that executives involved in torture would publicly 
disclose any wrongdoings.179 But what is needed, nevertheless, is a discussion 
on the democratic values and ethical benchmarks that were slowly established 
as common ground for Western intelligence services in the past decades. A 
very important cornerstone of this development was the creation of 
parliamentary accountability and oversight mechanisms to scrutinize the 
intelligence services. Consequently, in the final section I want to discuss the 
CIA programme as a high-profile example that raises the question of how 
increased networking between security bodies from various countries can be 
held accountable.  
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4. Lessons to be learned? 
Obviously, the CIA campaign and the reactions in European states thereto 
indicate the serious challenges that arise from a transnational provision of 
security. While security was traditionally provided within the nation-state 
framework, this is increasingly a task which requires cross-border activities. 
What is so far lacking at the policy-making level are clear answers to how to 
ensure the maintenance of democratic values and human rights in this 
respect, e.g. through an adequate and effective system of control and 
oversight of intelligence services. To explore such problems in the context of 
international intelligence co-operation, and in the context of CIA flights in 
particular, Terry Davis, the CoE Secretary General sent out a questionnaire 
in 2005 to all CoE Member States to inquire how their national laws ensure 
that acts by foreign agencies within their jurisdiction are subject to adequate 
controls. Based on the results, the CoE requested that the Member State 
governments take certain specific measures to satisfy their obligation to secure 
a system of control and oversight and thus not to escape their responsibility 
for the conduct at issue. The Secretary General identified four areas in which 
state governments should (re)consider actions180: 
• the regulation and oversight of intelligence services, in particular foreign 
ones; 
• international regulations with respect to air traffic (transiting aircraft); 
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• international rules on state immunity (human rights exceptions to rules of 
immunity); and 
• diplomatic assurances (should be replaced by formal agreements and 
guarantees). 
 
In the following, I will focus on two aspects only: diplomatic assurances and 
the regulation and oversight of intelligence services. 
 
 
Diplomatic assurances 
 
The solution that several European governments found with respect to the 
CIA rendition programme was to require diplomatic assurances from the US 
government. Such assurances are understood as an instrument to ensure the 
well-being of a rendered and/or imprisoned person. Those agreements come 
in various forms such as verbal notes, written agreements or memoranda of 
understanding. These instruments are very controversial, however.181 The 
Steering Committee of Human Rights (CDDH) of the Council of Europe 
discussed the various types of assurances, their usefulness and effectiveness 
based on a questionnaire sent to state governments. In its second report in 
2006, the Committee stated that no agreement on the issue could be found.182 
While some states found diplomatic assurances to be effective (i.e. they would 
ensure the well-being of a rendered person), others did not use such 
instruments at all. 
 
The key problem concerning diplomatic assurances is the lack of safeguards 
to guarantee their implementation. It remains unclear how binding such 
assurances between governmental bodies are. If, in the case of rendition and 
detention, they are breached by one party, very little can be done by the other 
party to ensure the person’s safety. To control post-facto whether such 
assurances were followed is difficult mainly for reasons of sovereignty since it 
would mean allowing foreign governmental authorities to have access to state 
security institutions (e.g. prisons). Consequently, the CoE Secretary General 
stated that ‘we cannot rely solely on assurances to ensure the effective 
implementation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention [i.e. 
the ECHR, C.H.]. We need first and foremost enforceable guarantees and 
control mechanisms.’183 
 
                                                 
 
181  For critical evaluations from a human rights perspective see, for example, Human Rights 
Watch (2005c); Amnesty International (2006c). 
182  Council of Europe, CDDH (2006). 
183  Council of Europe (2006), par. 2. 
41 
In the context of the CIA programme, diplomatic assurances were often used 
as a pretence to avoid careful investigations. A good example of this is the 
discussion on the secret prison on the UK overseas territory Diego Garcia. In 
June 2004, the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw emphasized that ‘(t)he 
United States authorities have repeatedly assured us that no detainees have at 
any time passed in transit through Diego Garcia or its territorial waters or 
have disembarked there and that the allegations to that effect are totally 
without foundation. The Government are satisfied that their assurances are 
correct.’184 Such firm assurances by the US government in this context were 
also pointed out in the 2007 Report of the UK Intelligence and Security 
Committee.185 As mentioned earlier, however, in early 2008 the UK 
government had to admit that the island had indeed been used for refuelling 
stops during rendition flights.  
 
Human rights organisations go one step further and argue that diplomatic 
assurances in this context might even weaken the prohibition of torture.186 A 
diplomatic assurance might be misused by governments by denying any 
further responsibility. If the state counterpart abroad ensures that it will not 
use torture, it is easy for a state government to deny any further – legal and 
moral - responsibility for the rendered person.   
 
 
The regulation and oversight of intelligence services 
 
The second aspect is the regulation and oversight of intelligence services. The 
reason for exploring such aspects in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the 
CIA programme is obvious given the use of extraordinary means. Such means 
require a ‘vigorous control, oversight and review of state security intelligence 
activities.’187 
 
Concerning the CIA programme, serious weaknesses can be pointed out 
concerning the parliamentary oversight of intelligence services. This was 
already mentioned by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, but I 
want to explore the aspect of public accountability in more depth in this 
section. Accountability is  a very contested concept but can be described as 
‘being liable to be required to give an account or explanation of actions and 
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where appropriate, to suffer the consequences, take the blame or undertake to 
put matters right, if it should appear that errors have been made.’188  
 
Up to the 1970s, intelligence services were only controlled and overseen by 
executive (i.e. internal and ministerial) accountability instruments, if at all. At 
that point, Western societies began to see such a control and oversight system 
as insufficient for democratic societies given the extraordinary powers and the 
secretive work of the intelligence services.189 Parliamentary oversight was 
understood as an additional safeguard to ensure a responsible attitude by 
intelligence services as well as their democratic accountability. Some state 
governments strongly resisted any oversight arrangements but scandals in the 
field of intelligence and sometimes debates among the general public created 
such political pressure that governments finally agreed to certain 
arrangements of oversight and democratic accountability.190 While ‘(t)he 
ultimate authority and legitimacy of intelligence agencies rest upon legislative 
approval of their powers, operations and expenditure’191, five elements for the 
democratic control of intelligence services have been identified by academic 
scholars:  
• internal intelligence control by the individual services themselves, 
• strong executive control,  
• parliamentary oversight, 
• judicial review, and  
• external review by independent civil society organizations.192  
 
There is a fundamental dilemma in the arrangement of any system for 
overseeing intelligence services, in particular a parliamentary one: how can 
activities be regulated, controlled and overseen which have to take place in 
secrecy in order to be successful?193 Both the academic literature on this topic 
and the practical experience in recent decades suggest, however, that it is 
possible to have legislative control in this field although countries have found 
very different ways of establishing a system of intelligence oversight.194 Thus, 
there is no single normative model for the democratic control of intelligence 
services. The systems of parliamentary oversight vary with respect to their 
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mandate, structure, membership and access to classified information, or 
investigative powers in general.195 To ensure a ‘good’ or satisfactory 
parliamentary oversight of intelligence services in democratic societies, Hans 
Born and Thorsten Wetzling identified three aspects, namely the maintenance 
of parliamentary ownership over intelligence oversight procedures, the 
establishment of ‘embedded’ human rights in intelligence affairs and the 
safeguarding of the political neutrality of intelligence services.196 
 
The establishment of legitimate and effective democratic control of 
intelligence remains a difficult task.197 The work of parliamentary committees 
is usually so secretive that not only citizens but also parliamentarians in the 
plenum only get bits and pieces of information, if at all. Both the public and 
parliamentarians have to trust the committee members that they do a good 
job. At the same time, only the provision of information allows a reasonable 
public discussion. This is also an issue of state ‘branding’ and of establishing a 
positive image of intelligence services. Consequently, certain Western services 
recently decided to become more proactive and started to communicate with 
the public in various forms. The websites of various services have been 
smartened up and filled with more detailed information than ever before, 
services such as the Dutch AIVD provide a small-scale demonstration of 
spying techniques and there are several museums such as Moscow’s KGB 
museum and the privately operated International Spy Museum in 
Washington. Also, some services such as MI5 have allowed journalists, for 
example, to report on the work of some of their staff members and, for the 
first time in the history of MI5, the serving head of the Service, Jonathan 
Evans, gave journalists an interview in January 2009.198 This cautious process 
of opening the doors must certainly be understood as a driving force for staff 
recruitment for the services, but it should not be interpreted as only a way to 
attract new potential employees. It is also a way of communicating with 
citizens in general. The question remains, however, what can be done to 
ensure democratic oversight given the increasing linkages between intelligence 
services. In the words of Born and Wetzling: ‘How can the danger be averted 
that national intelligence policy-makers utilize cooperative arrangements to 
circumvent national human rights standards, for instance, those that govern 
the legality of practices applied to obtain information on suspected 
terrorists?’199 
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European governments are aware that the increasing co-operation between 
intelligence services raises such new and difficult questions. For example, in 
the report on the UN Convention against Torture, the UK’s Joint Committee 
on Human Rights emphasized the need to establish a proper framework for 
intelligence sharing by identifying minimum standards and establishing an 
adequate system of monitoring and scrutinizing compliance with those 
standards.200 This discussion is related to the question of what information 
provided by foreign services should be accepted and how it can be ensured 
that this information was gathered under ‘legitimate’ circumstances. 
Concerning the discussion in the UK, a distinction is sometimes made 
between information which the UK’s own authorities gather and information 
which is provided by foreign authorities. While the former is officially 
condemned if gathered under torture, there seems to be a more ‘relaxed’ view 
in the latter case. From a legal point of view, the use of information gathered 
by torture in court is clearly illegal, but at the operational level the attitude 
might be rather pragmatic. While this issue was under discussion in the 
House of Lords in the UK, for example, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead stated 
that governments might use information obtained by torture by referring to 
cases in which ‘the government cannot be expected to close its eyes to this 
information at the price of endangering the lives of its own citizens. Moral 
repugnance to torture does not require this.’201 
 
The discussion on the CIA rendition programme leads to a broader challenge 
inherent in the work of intelligence agencies, namely that it has some 
international aspects. Arguably, the appropriate political level to oversee 
increasing cross-border information-sharing would be the international one. 
Such an oversight system would have to face several hurdles ranging from the 
co-ordination of the collaboration with intelligence services and oversight 
bodies abroad to the likely increase in the budget given the need for additional 
arrangements such as legal experts or translators. However, the hurdle for any 
overall international oversight system in the near future would be that it seems 
likely that ‘no state would agree to be bound by the limits on intelligence 
gathering it would demand of its peers’.202 Indeed, this problem would be even 
more intensified concerning the oversight of activities of foreign intelligence 
services in a state’s territory.203 Not much research has been carried out in this 
field so far, but one option to circumvent state concerns in this respect seems 
to be to implement measures to allow a certain amount of oversight at the 
transnational level. One might think of the establishment of a supranational 
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oversight body. Apart from the immense problems of the mandate, structure 
and functions of such a body, this could only be a solution in the long run. 
Also, effective control and oversight needs an extraordinary knowledge of the 
mandate and functioning of the intelligence services.204 To ensure this at a 
supranational level would be extraordinarily challenging. 
 
One option which could be implemented much more easily would be the 
establishment of ad hoc accountability forums. In this case, state governments 
would agree to create a framework which allows the creation of flexible bodies 
of accountability, the composition and equipment of which would depend on 
the individual case. This might be established within the framework of 
existing regional security co-operation arrangements such as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or, to start with, the EU. Since the EU 
obliges police and intelligence co-operation among its member states, in 
particular since the 9/11 attacks, it should consider a responsibility with 
respect to a democratic control and judicial oversight system for such co-
operation. Finally, a measure which could be implemented most easily would 
be a more intense exchange with other oversight bodies abroad. For example, 
the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) bilaterally exchanges 
views and ideas with other state oversight bodies. One indicator of an 
emerging multilateral exchange among oversight bodies of intelligence 
services is the International Intelligence Review Agencies’ Conference which 
takes place in a different city biennially. Not much information is available on 
this Conference, but this is perhaps a small step towards what Peter Gill has 
called the ‘oversight community’.205 Such an exchange might be restricted to 
the exchange of structural and organizational issues (composition, expertise, 
and so on) but it could also be thought of as an opportunity to exchange good 
practices. There are certain international intelligence bodies such as the Club 
of Berne which might provide a proper framework for the multilateral 
exchange of such ideas (unfortunately, the public is not informed about the 
activities of the body at all). Bilateral instruments might be useful as well, in 
particular if very sensitive topics would be at stake. Mechanisms to establish 
ethical standards and to ensure the observance of those regulations become 
even more relevant in the transnational sphere since, for example, legal 
instruments are less developed than within the nation-state framework. 
 
The ongoing integration process within the EU and the establishment of an 
‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ), thus the area of European 
internal security, might illustrate that the establishment of a multilateral 
forum for the (ad hoc) oversight of certain international activities of 
intelligence services might be possible. It shows that a certain degree of co-
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operation is possible in the area of law enforcement and other security issues. 
Also, information-sharing and closer cooperation among security agencies 
within the EU is one of the core issues of the EU counter-terrorism strategy.206 
Bodies such as the European Police Office (Europol) and the Joint Situation 
Centre (SitCen) need information delivered by member states’ authorities so 
as to fulfil their mandates effectively. Situations are imaginable in which 
information gathered through torture is later processed at the EU level which 
might then lead to further EU decisions and operational activities back at the 
nation-state level. A responsibility to accompany the operational collaboration 
by a European oversight system can therefore be argued. Finally, the 
European jurisdiction already has a certain impact on European intelligence 
services. In the case of the UK, Mark Phythian argues that it was also thanks 
to the impact of European law on the British polity that led to an emerging 
intelligence legislation and parliamentary oversight system.207  
 
That European judicial institutions can play an important role can also be 
illustrated by a very early example, namely the role of the European 
Commission on Human Rights208 in the ‘long war’ in Ireland. During this 
period, British security forces used coercive investigation techniques such as 
‘standing against a wall’, sleep deprivation and food denial. Because of that, 
the British government was accused of torture. In October 1972 the Irish 
government brought a case against the UK to the Commission, and the final 
report by the Commission was provided in January 1976. Therein, the 
Commission considered the interrogation methods to be inhumane 
treatment.209 This decision did not exactly stop the British government from 
continuing to use extreme means (then mainly covert means), but it clearly 
damaged the UK government’s international reputation in a political and 
moral context. Similarly, observers argue that the emphasis of the US 
government on the effectiveness of harsh interrogation techniques ‘did not 
reduce the damage to the moral standing of the United States caused by 
revelations of abuse at Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo Bay, and secret CIA 
detention facilities.’210 
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Ethical implications 
 
The discussion on waterboarding in particular should give rise to questions 
whether and, if so, which ethical guidelines exist for the activities of 
intelligence services. As the above discussion has illustrated, there are various 
ways in which European intelligence officers became involved in rendition 
flights and the interrogation of terror suspects, sometimes only in an indirect 
way by providing questions that the local interrogator should raise. However, 
the question remains what should be done with information that has been, or 
might have been, obtained through torture.  
 
Apart from the fact that torture is banned by several international treaties and 
agreements211 of which at least all Western democratic societies are parties, 
there are also operational, empirical arguments against any ‘revival’ of such 
instruments. From the perspective of law enforcement, the problem is that the 
information cannot be used as evidence in criminal prosecution and therefore 
torture might be counterproductive for prosecution.212 From a historical 
perspective, the British experience with terrorism in Northern Ireland is 
illuminating. Apparently, interrogated suspects often had no detailed 
information and were not helpful. Means such as infiltration and 
eavesdropping would have been more effective in such circumstances.213 Also, 
in the case of the French government’s fight against Algerian rebels, Anne 
Appelbaum could not find archival evidence that and, if so, how torture 
helped the French side.214 Finally, it can be argued that it is very difficult for 
the interrogator to identify true and false claims made by the tortured 
individual.215 Information gathered by torture is not always reliable. 
 
At first glance, ethics and intelligence seem to be an oxymoron per se since at 
least field agents use means which would never be given to ordinary citizens. 
In such a field, however, professional ethics become even more important. 
Also, many staff members of an intelligence service work as analysts and 
collectors and in that function they sometimes deal with very sensitive 
information by collecting, analysing and processing it. Their end-result – 
intelligence – informs political decision-making. In times of new technologies 
the methods for the collection of information are changing rapidly. Through 
some of these new developments intelligence gathering is facilitated in the 
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sense that it can be conducted ‘from a distance’ (e.g. satellite images, 
telephone and internet interception, observation through CCTV cameras). 
This development raises new challenges for the ethics of the intelligence 
services. Furthermore, given the increasing international co-operation 
between intelligence services, it is essential for one country to be able to trust 
that the information provided by a second country is both accurate and has 
not been gathered through extreme means, namely through torture. Realists 
might argue that trust is not even necessary as long as the necessary 
information is shared. But information is, of course, easier and more 
beneficially shared in an arena in which at least a minimum of trust exists. 
Also, a service has to trust that the information provided by its counterpart is 
reliable.  
 
Because diplomatic assurances are not sufficient in all cases, ethical guidelines 
are arguably an important element to bring more reliability into the world of 
intelligence services. Activities of intelligence services enter ‘many grey areas 
of moral thought’216 as the CIA extraordinary rendition campaign illustrates. 
Not much is so far known about codes of ethics or codes of conduct in this 
field. While internal guidelines seem to exist at least in some Western 
countries, they are confidential and not open to the public. Studies on ethical 
principles within the intelligence services, such as the one provided by Ken 
Pekel (1998) on the CIA, are extremely rare. Moreover, Andregg is very 
critical about the use of written ethical guidelines since they might not easily 
fit the reality of intelligence services’ day-to-day business and their mandate to 
work towards/for the security of the nation.217 Similarly, Pekel’s study 
illustrates that there is more to ethics than only guidelines; perhaps we can 
call it the ‘culture’ of an agency. Arguably, it needs a form of accountability to 
ensure that certain ethical standards are applied.218 This is one more reason 
why it is necessary to establish certain elements of cross-border and 
international structures of accountability. 
 
In simple terms, one can distinguish between a deontological and a 
consequentialist understanding of ethics. The deontologist focuses on 
absolute normative criteria, while the consequentialist focuses on the aim or 
the consequences. In terms of torture, the former would argue that it is 
forbidden to torture because it is morally wrong and therefore not acceptable 
under any circumstances. The latter would argue that there might be ends 
that justify the use of torture. This is often illustrated by referring to a ‘ticking 
bomb’ scenario. In this hypothetical scenario, one assumes that police or 
intelligence officers are interrogating someone who has placed a bomb 
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somewhere and which will kill thousands of people unless the security bodies 
manage to get more information about its precise location. Although this 
scenario is very implausible, it is referred to in countless variations.219 The 
main question concerning the consequentialist view remains, however: how 
can one know for certain what the consequences would be? The main 
criticism against deontologists is that sticking to absolute norms might be to 
put thousands of lives at risk.220 Such decisions are not easy to take but in a 
liberal democratic society this needs to be discussed extensively. There is a 
distinctive difference between legality and morality in this field and, as the 
CIA case shows, governments might hide behind the assurance that their 
actions were legal (such as the provisions of legal memoranda by the US 
government to narrow the definition of torture) but they might be 
nevertheless unethical or immoral in the eyes of the broader public. In the 
case of extraordinary renditions, this refers not only to the US, but also to an 
international public. This is exactly why democratic accountability and 
oversight of intelligence services deserve an important role in democratic 
societies, and why thorough investigations by European governments into the 
allegations in the context of CIA flights and prisons are so critical. As the then 
President of the Israeli Supreme Court argued in a decision against the use of 
torture against detainees: ‘A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand 
tied behind its back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule of 
law and the liberty of an individual constitute important components in its 
understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and 
this strength allows it to overcome difficulties.’221 
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5. Conclusion 
Current counter-terrorism activities include types of information-gathering 
and sharing which are exercised across borders and potentially have a global 
reach. The CIA’s extraordinary rendition campaign arguably constitutes a 
particular case of international intelligence liaison. While some observers have 
pointed out that the campaign has been a (temporary) measure in 
extraordinary times, this paper has suggested that illuminating lessons can be 
learnt from this case and the pattern of global security provision that emerges 
from it. In particular, it has been analysed in how far the many ways of 
interaction between intelligence actors across borders can give rise to serious 
concerns about the way in which such liaison can be held to account.  
 
While scandals in the field of intelligence services were necessary to push the 
idea of a certain degree of oversight and accountability of the services in the 
1970s and 1980s, the CIA rendition flights ought to be an event which pushes 
oversight and control regulations further, including the oversight of foreign 
intelligence activities. In particular, the activities should be understood as a 
wake-up call for a more efficient and powerful system of parliamentary 
oversight of international intelligence activities. Although these types of 
activities are inherently international issues, the business of intelligence 
remains a domain of sovereign nation states and the crucial systems of 
parliamentary accountability and judicial control will also remain located at 
the domestic level. This paper suggests, however, that transnational ad hoc 
investigations by bodies such as the Council of Europe and the European 
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Parliament appear to be promising new elements in the global accountability 
landscape. Indeed, the Council of Europe’s focus on human rights issues has 
led to the most rigorous investigation in this context so far. However, both 
transnational investigative bodies do not provide a permanent, formal format 
for such investigations and both lack powers to enforce their 
recommendations.   
 
Moreover, any kind of accountability system – both at the domestic and the 
transnational level – in the context of counter-terrorism intelligence co-
operation is severely hampered by the culture of excessive secrecy which 
traditionally surrounds intelligence liaison, but also the policy field of counter-
terrorism in general. It has been illustrated in this paper at various points that 
such an approach potentially blocks or, at least, weakens any investigations 
into such activities, for example with respect to the challenges which the 
Milan prosecutors face in the trial concerning Abu Omar’s rendition. To 
justify such a high level of secrecy, governmental authorities often claim that 
more transparency would jeopardize national security. Arguably, such claims 
sometimes appear to be of a fairly flimsy nature, as has been pointed out in 
the 2009 English High Court ruling on the release of documents concerning 
Binyam Mohamed’s treatment in prison.  
 
Intelligence services are governmental institutions and that is why they ‘ought 
to act on behalf of the people, too’.222 Information-gathering and sharing 
across borders can certainly be a valuable means in the fight against terrorism. 
Needless to say, tracing suspected terrorists and anticipating terrorist attacks 
in a bilateral or multilateral environment is extraordinarily difficult and 
requires very sensitive and secretive approaches. However, this must not 
occur at the cost of those individuals under suspicion, their social 
environment or any other people, whether they are detainees or victims of 
rendition. More intense bilateral and multilateral sharing of information 
requires that governments ensure, even more so, both compliance with the 
rule of law223 and that the services’ activities respect human rights. 
Instruments to ensure such compliance can be implemented and enforced at 
the national level. Fighting terrorism has always been a question of norms, 
values and, hence, moral standing. This is an experience shared by many 
European countries from the 1970s onwards. To maintain democratic values 
and human rights ought to be the overall aim of any fight against political 
violence.  
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While President Barack Obama has started to demolish the legacy of his 
predecessor concerning Guantánamo Bay, torture and rendition by four 
executive orders, problems remain, however, as to how to wind up the 
remaining issues. There is good reason to call for a multilateral solution for 
the closure of Guantánamo Bay, as US Vice President Joseph Biden did 
during the 45th Security Conference in Munich in January 2009. As this paper 
has shown, several EU countries are currently hesitant to share the burden. 
To take in a few former Guantánamo detainees would not mean taking away 
the responsibility of the US government, however. It would rather allow for a 
swifter release of the inmates based on humanitarian grounds. It is an 
important symbolic gesture to declare that an ‘institution like Guantánamo 
can and should not exist in the longer term’, as the German Chancellor stated 
in 2006, but it needs a more hands-on approach to effectively co-operate with 
the Obama administration in the process of closing down this detention 
facility.  
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